The age of hybrid governance is already upon us. China today is a hybrid of 19th-century communist ideology and 21st-century capitalist practice, yet it stands on the cusp of becoming the world’s largest economy. Asian state capitalism is actually a centuries-old European practice dating back at least to the government of Victorian Britain, which gradually brought the British East India Company under its direct supervision and control over the course of the 19th-century, absorbing all of its colonies and wealth. Could China’s state-owned companies and banks today—with their expansive operations and lending across the developing world—be the East India Company of the 21st-century? As much as this article is about the future of governance, there are always important echoes from the past.
More and more entities occupy the middle ground between state-owned and fully privatized, especially in emerging markets. What was taboo under the “Washington Consensus” is today the norm, particularly sizable government stakes in leading industries, whether in the form of ownership, management, subsidies, or other forms of preferential treatment. More fundamental than this shift in the regulatory environment is an evolution in the very nature of the players. The many variations that occur when public not only meets private but blends with it are what we can call “hybrid governance”: government-sponsored entities with multistakeholder management, publicly financed corporations that compete in the international marketplace, federally chartered bodies with substantial private investment, and other combinations. In other words, public-sector skeletons with private-sector DNA. Many of the most prominent state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), and special economic zones (SEZs) exemplify elements of this increasingly visible public-private fusion that goes beyond the traditional division of labor between public- and private-sector roles toward a more active, if blurry, cogovernance among them.
The return of parastatals
Today we are witnessing a massive proliferation in the number of new parastatal entities around the world.1 Parastatals are wholly or partially publicly owned but often privately managed; they include wealth funds, extractive companies, utilities, administrative and judicial centers, export-processing zones, and urban-development authorities that run—with little or no democratic scrutiny—some of the most important pools of money and sites of growth. It is precisely in authoritarian-capitalist China and the petro monarchies of the Middle East that one finds the greatest number of parastatal entities. Power diffusion continues even in the shadow of strength.
Over the past two centuries, parastatals have come and gone in waves. In the post-Depression West, a wave of nationalizations created parastatals that became an institutionalized form of unemployment insurance, providing jobs in excess of productive needs. Operating in closed domestic markets with little shareholder scrutiny, many became bastions of mediocrity and corruption. In the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher’s Britain led a global movement away from purely state-run enterprises and privatized widely to curb subsidies, reduce inefficiencies, and improve services.
Recent decades have witnessed a gradual revival of parastatals that foreshadowed their present surge. They gained access to international capital markets and have leveraged investment to expand operations. By floating shares on exchanges, contracting with auditing firms, establishing independent boards of directors, restricting subsidies from the government, and improving recruiting standards and managerial incentives, parastatals have been able to make themselves competitive with the private sector even if most are still less efficient.
Rather than disappearing, therefore, parastatals appear to have expanded their scope and mutated their forms. South Africa and India each have dozens of parastatal vehicles spanning functional fields such as the postal service, energy, railways, telecoms, health care, alcohol, gambling, and education. Britain’s BBC; Australia’s ABC; the United States’ Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Overseas Private Investment Corporation; Brazil’s Petrobras; Russia’s Gazprom; Qatar’s Al Jazeera; and China’s China Mobile are all publicly financed but independently operating entities. Today there are very few, if any, areas of governance that have not been placed in the custody of parastatal entities that undertake commercial activities on the government’s behalf.
There are very sensible reasons that parastatals have assumed such prominence in governance today. First and foremost, legacy institutions are broken. Frustration has grown around the inability of traditional ministries to manage investment, infrastructure, manpower, and other fundamental concerns. Today it is such ministries that serve as “unemployment insurance” the way parastatals did in the post-Depression era. By contrast, today’s parastatals are now accorded the higher-profile tasks such as strategically spending currency reserves (as SWFs do) and raising private coinvestment for mega-infrastructure projects. To secure the capacity to meet these responsibilities, governments now place their top talent at parastatals and recruit internationally, further elevating their status as the key locus of effective governance. In short, parastatals are the entities everyone wants to do business with because in places where politics is an opaque void or a byzantine labyrinth, they “get things done.”
Second, the new parastatals are a response to the speed and demands of globalization, which requires faster-paced bodies that are more responsive and more technocratic to harness capital flows while asserting national political control. Emerging markets in particular need to correct for the market failure by which private capital prefers the stability of developed markets. State-owned enterprises, national oil companies, SWFs, and urban-redevelopment projects are the most visible and well-endowed examples of parastatals seeking to master the demands of globalization.
China’s State Grid Corporation and Japan Post Holdings rank among the top ten largest companies in the world and can rely on public financing to keep them afloat despite massive inefficiencies. (Chinese state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, still represent an estimated 65 percent of the economy, while Kazakhstan’s joint-stock Samruk Kazyna accounts for more than half of GDP through its more than 100 constituent companies.) The parastatals CNPC, Gazprom, and Petrobras are also among the largest companies in the world today, competing with Exxon, Shell, and BP for contracts worldwide. Such giants not only have public support but also support the public: Saudi Aramco generates approximately 90 percent of government revenue, while Gazprom’s tax payments generate 10 percent of Russia’s GDP. Statoil and Petrobras, by listing on international exchanges, have gradually raised sufficient capital to become world leaders in deep-water exploration. These examples demonstrate how, unlike the SOEs of the past, today’s parastatals don’t fear international linkages, are happy to encourage diverse minority ownership, and embrace competing aggressively internationally.
Like national oil companies, SWFs have also existed for decades (for example, the Kuwait Investment Authority was founded in 1953) but recently acquired far greater prominence as some of them climbed toward $1 trillion in assets under management. Arab and Chinese SWFs’ nimble acquisition of large shares of prominent Western banks and advanced technologies, as well as their increasingly diversified allocation toward other emerging markets, makes them financially oriented and diplomatically important players. Indeed, the lack of clarity over whether they are purely financial or also strategically motivated has raised concerns and barriers, even in countries seriously in need of foreign direct investment. Collectively, these types of parastatals have been crucial for rising powers to capture the commanding heights of international finance. Their recruitment of top investment-banking and private-equity talent and riskier international investments are a major departure from decades of more conservative asset management by central banks.
Parastatals have also been crucial for quickly achieving the level of international regulatory harmonization that international investors demand. This is the niche filled by SEZs, special administrative zones, and free zones. In 1980, Shenzhen became China’s first SEZ, quickly leveraging foreign investment to rise up the value chain in manufacturing and now in services and technology. Also in the 1980s, the United Arab Emirates launched Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority, which catapulted the emirate into the top tier of global logistics and trans-shipment hubs. The side-stepping or suspension of national laws in the interest of harmonizing to international standards remains a key driver of the establishment of SEZs from Mozambique to Vietnam. But the Gulf petro states remain the most prolific creators of new parastatals. The Dubai International Financial Center, for example, has now had domestic commercial disputes referred to its independent courts due to its higher standards of professionalism and efficiency. Parastatals can thus be productive bridgeheads of global rules into local arenas, bending the latter ever more toward the former.
Because the vast majority of foreign investment in emerging and frontier markets remains in capital cities, urban redevelopment has become another key arena of parastatal activity. One of the great examples of city-region success comes from the once deeply troubled separatist Basque region of Spain. At the height of political tension with Madrid in the early 1990s, Basque authorities created an umbrella parastatal called Metropoli-30, which convened leading industrial and political figures to launch a total overhaul of the province’s shipping, rail, urban-infrastructure, and cultural strategies. The result is visible not only in the gleaming Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao but also in an overall standard of living that is considered the best in all of Spain. This example proves that fiscal autonomy can matter much more than political sovereignty.
Where urbanization, infrastructure, and advanced technology come together in so-called smart cities, a diverse range of parastatals have emerged. For example, Songdo International Business District in South Korea is chartered by the municipality of Incheon, but the largest shareholder in the futuristic real estate is an American commercial developer. By contrast, the Skolkovo district of Russia is entirely government owned. All smart cities seek to partner with corporate investors and academic institutions to build an effective ecosystem. Indeed, without technology partners such as IBM and Cisco, such instant cities would just be high-end housing projects. Whether or not these city projects are owned privately or by the government, they must be jointly managed in order to succeed. It is no wonder then that mayors are increasingly referred to as the “CEO of the city.”
Perhaps the world’s most ambitious infrastructure project at the moment is the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), which aims to build an entire new artery of cities, railways, airports, expressways, power projects, and innovation clusters on a 1,400 kilometer stretch across seven states, firmly linking India’s two most important cities. Given low investor interest in India today, creating an autonomous parastatal unit such as DMIC—whose main offices occupy a hotel suite rather than a government building—was an essential prerequisite to bring the largest investors, such as the government of Japan and India’s major conglomerates, on board.
Is hybrid governance better governance?
It should come as no surprise that parastatals have emerged to unite whatever political will exists in the public sector with whatever resources can be corralled from the private sector. The post–Cold War period has witnessed dozens of ineffective and populist democracies, from Argentina to Greece to Thailand, as well as postcommunist states and postcolonial states still struggling with ossified public sectors.
There is no doubt that the current wave of parastatals has dramatically improved the efficiency of governance and thus represents to some extent the triumph of technocracy over democracy. The question thus becomes what impact will they have on accountability. Indeed, to a large extent each parastatal has a unique bureaucratic structure and legal mandate that makes its authority specific yet opaque and its management structure clear but detached from democratic oversight. Even if parastatals do not reflect a deliberated “will of the people,” at their best they can be stewards of Rousseau’s “general will,” improving hard and soft infrastructure and building companies that mobilize and empower struggling societies. On the other hand, at times they can also crowd out a genuinely inclusive private sector in favor of corporate monuments manipulated by “bureau-garchs” for personal gain.
Alongside the other form of hybrid governance in vogue today—public-private partnerships—parastatals give rise to a schizophrenia about the relationship between public and private. It is only half in jest, therefore, that futurist Peter Schwartz likes to call Singapore “the best run company in the world.” Indeed, up to 60 percent of Singapore’s GDP is linked to companies owned wholly or partially by Temasek and associated holding companies. Ultimately, the measure of their utility and desirability will be performance. Parastatals should be studied more closely to determine which most successfully blend public mandates and capital with private investment and management to bring about the most successful outcomes for nations and citizens.
Parastatals have clearly become the tool of choice for governments to modernize governance and manage globalization. Despite the lack of public scrutiny, they have proven to be effective vehicles for harnessing scarce financial and managerial resources. Furthermore, as international competition for investment intensifies, increasing numbers of states are likely to take the path of parastatals to promote their attractiveness to the outside world. Governance has never ceased to be a competitive arena. Exporting parastatal models—whether Singapore’s land-management authority, Rotterdam’s port, or Songdo’s smart city—is a new economic and commercial field. Parastatals are spreading faster than any other institutional form because they have been necessary and successful in the absence of alternatives—and are competitive today, even against more democratic options.
Yuko Aoyama and Balaji Parthasarathy explore possibilities for new governance structures that blend social and economic missions and advance the livelihoods of the poor in the Global South.
Yuko Aoyama and Balaji Parthasarathy explore possibilities for new governance structures that blend social and economic missions and advance the livelihoods of the poor in the Global South.. Although various aspects of the hybrid domain have been reported and analyzed as separate processes – from the marketization of the state to the socialization of markets the authors argue that these processes should be understood within a single conceptual framework.. The authors seek to articulate how corporations, states, and civil society organizations develop common agendas, despite the differences in their primary objectives.. Furthermore, transnational social entrepreneurs, mainly transplants from the Global North, including those not of Indian origin, play an increasingly pivotal role in coordinating globally sourced technology, business know-how, and financing, to develop solutions to critical local problems.. Combined, India is emerging as a location that specializes in design and engineering for the perceived needs of populations in the Global South.. economic geography , hybrid domain , India , social innovation
As compared to the existing top-down and rigid hierarchical governance models, the hybrid governance models (HGMs), which allow loose and minimal institutional structure are in continuous flux, more flexible and adaptable to the external shocks.. Introducing the Problem The limited capacity of the current liberal multilateral order (MLO) to properly address challenges such as successive financial crises, worsening income distribution, increasing migration, climate change, environmental degradation, pandemic, and unbalanced trade structure between different countries and regions have stimulated debates that neo-liberal globalization has reached its limits (Mearsheimer, 2019; Rodrik, 2020) .. The recently ratified such comprehensive agreements between Japan and the EU to fill the leadership gap that arose after the withdrawal of the US in the field of global cooperation and even damaging it under Trump’s rule may evolve into a new stage with the return of the Biden government to international cooperation mechanisms after the US elections.. After discussing the nature of emerging populist-hybrid regimes as well as the characteristics of the needed hybrid governance (HGMs), recent attempt of Japan and the EU will be very briefly mentioned to highlight the importance of collective leadership in strengthening the existing MLO and open the door for their reformation finally.. As viewed from this perspective, the clash of norms opens up new opportunities for more pluralistic patterns of globalization such as hybrid governance models (HGMs) and carves out precious space for emerging countries (Menard, 2004, 2010) .. First, outside, China demands and requests for a greater say in the existing international institutions through modestly reforming the basic institutions of the MLO, such as World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to better reﬂect China’s increased economic power and status had encountered rejection and resistance by the US since 2010 until the related reform package passed in 2015.. While the vested interest was hindering the long overdue reforms, China’s push for a regional institutions such and the BRI and The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), within which it would be dominant or at least have considerable impact was a reﬂection of Beijing’s frustration over the Western, especially American, dominance of the existing international multilateral bodies.. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis The EU-Japan’s Cooperation: Balancing Hybrid Governance China’s efforts to export its systemic aspects through BRI with the mentioned institutional loopholes and implementations have triggered dangerous retaliatory acts from the US, increasing requests from the EU for further reciprocity wide range of economic activities and opposing waves in many developing countries.. In an environment of fragility created by the US’s withdrawal from multilateral cooperation mechanisms in the Trump administration and China’s efforts to expand its disproportionate and unilateral sphere of influence to fill this gap, cooperation between countries with a shared vision, such as Japan and the EU, is critical in providing the leadership required for the production of Global Public Goods (GPGs).. A recent EU-China policy paper clarifies the position of the EU visa-a-vis China as follows: “In different policy areas, China is simultaneously a cooperation partner, with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives.. Ongoing efforts for inclusive partnership between the like-minded actors, such as Japan, EU and multilateral organizations (i.e., the World Banka, multinational companies, civil society organizations) would create the required synergy for the needed public goods for cooperation with hybrid characteristics provided they fulfil the following properties (Berkowsky, 2020; Söderbaum, 2015) .As Evenett and Baldwin (2020) correctly note, there is an obvious need for alternative ‘interface mechanisms’ (i.e., the BRI) that allows different forms of capitalism to co-prosper.. "The new age of hybridity and clash of norms: China, BRICS, and challenges of global governance in a postliberal international order.". Such developments as global economic crisis, American containment policies, and several domestic economic challenges forced China to announce BRI to stimulate domestic demand and find external export markets in developing countries, mainly, through large-scale overseas (infrastructure) investment.
The Rise of the Hybrid Domain: Collaborative Governance for Social Innovation 1785360426, 9781785360428 - EBIN.PUB ›
By conceptualizing the rise of the hybrid domain as an emerging institutional form that overlaps public and private inte...
Social innovation in global contexts 4.1 Social innovation 4.1.1 Defining social innovation 4.1.2 Context in social innovation 4.1.3 Proximity in social innovation 4.1.4 Technology in social innovation 4.1.5 Sustainability in social innovation 4.2 Collaborative governance for social innovation 4.2.1 Corporations 4.2.2 Users and consumers 4.2.3 Incentivizing social innovation 4.2.4 The state in social innovation 4.3 Conclusion. Case studies from India 7.1 Innovating on healthcare delivery and medical diagnostics 7.1.1 Rural healthcare franchising with local social networks 7.1.2 From thermoplastics to silk fabric chips for immunoassays 7.1.3 Dry reagents for resource-constrained supply chains 7.2 Resolving information asymmetries for small-scale farmers 7.2.1 Video-based content creation and distribution 7.2.2 Text messaging service for crop prices 7.2.3 Building farmers’ capacities to reach markets 7.3 Promoting inclusive development for rural populations 7.3.1 Voice-enabled mobile phone platform for tribal communities 7.3.2 ICT employment creation and training in rural areas 7.3.3 “Bank-less” banking for rural migrants 7.4 Sustaining livelihoods in the informal sector 7.4.1 Training and skill certification for construction workers 7.4.2 An employment portal for informal work 7.4.3 Enhancing the cash flows and creditworthiness of rural informal retailers 7.5 Introducing renewable energy 7.5.1 Solar systems as a catalyst for social change 7.5.2 Micro-franchises for renewable energy 7.6 What the cases tell us Domain flexibility 8.1 From CSR to shared value creation 8.1.1 The limits of goodwill 8.1.2 Shared value creation: opportunities and challenges. 8.1.3 The socially sustainable business model (SSBM) Learning through collaborating 8.2.1 Varieties of collaborative arrangements 8.2.2 Collaborating with the state 8.2.3 Challenges in collaboration The rise of hybrid organizations 8.3.1 Transitions from NGOs to social enterprises 8.3.2 NGOs established by social enterprises 8.3.3 The Robin Hood model 8.3.4 Corporations established by NGOs 8.3.5 Joint NGO–corporate set-up and collaborative polygon Conclusion. Private foundations in the United States Macro-economic indicators: BRICS countries Education, health, and infrastructure indicators, BRICS countries Average annual GDP growth rate in India Infrastructure spending as a share of GDP, India Registered NGOs in India Sources of funding for NGOs in India Results from the survey questionnaire: R&D for BOP markets Results from the survey questionnaire: sources of knowledge for the BOP market 7.1 Healthcare system indicators, BRICS countries 7.2 Urban non-agricultural informal employment, India (percentage distribution by sector, 2011–2012) 8.1 Illustrative examples of collaboration in the hybrid domain 8.2 Results of the questionnaire survey: MNE–NGO collaboration A.1 List of interviewees. MGNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (India) MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology MNE Multinational enterprise MOP Middle-of-the-pyramid MOU Memorandum of understanding MSMEs Micro, small and medium enterprises NASSCOM National Association of Software and Services Companies (India) NCX National Commodity Exchange (India) NGO Non-governmental organization NRHM National Rural Health Mission (India) NRI Non-resident Indian ODA Official development assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PMGSY Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana or the Prime Minister’s Rural Roads Program (India) POS Point-of-sale PPP Public–private partnership PV Photovoltaic R&D Research and development RFP Request for proposal RTBI Rural Technology and Business Incubator S&T Science and technology SE Social enterprise/entrepreneur SHG Self-help group SMEs Small- and medium-sized enterprises SMS Short message service SSA Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan or the Education for All Movement (India) SSBM Socially sustainable business model STs Scheduled Tribes TSE Transnational social enterprise/entrepreneur UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Various financial intermediaries, who are active in funding social enterprises, are involved in the development of social capital markets (Kaplan & Grossman, 2010).29 Sources of impact investments are therefore many and do not only include venture philanthropy and HNWIs, but also such entities as social-impact capital aggregators (which assemble capital from HNWIs and serve as intermediaries), social-impact secondary market operators (which securitize bundled loans as collaterals to issue bonds), social stock exchanges (which serve as platforms where funds are matched with seekers of funds),30 and quasi-public investment funds (e.g. the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund established by the Inter-American Development Bank, Big Society Capital funded by the UK lottery).. 4.1.1 Defining Social Innovation Long before the term social innovation became popular, Moulaert et al. (2013) discuss how Drucker (1987) defined social innovation, as “innovation in meeting social needs of, or delivering social benefits to, communities” and conceptualized it broadly as institutional design that generates social benefits.. face-to-face interactions 58 failure double 55, 189, 190 heterarchical 25 market 12, 18–19, 21, 25, 64, 189–90 non-market 56 systemic 188–9 state 2, 4, 11, 53, 55, 57, 67, 91, 189 family planning 113–14 finance, micro- see micro-finance finance, social see social finance financial inclusion see inclusion financial literacy 167–8 firm, theory of the 37, 39, 62 see also corporation; enterprise for profit sector 39, 65, 158, 160, 162–3 flexibility domain 12–13, 31–3, 137–8, 188 organizational 29–30 scalar 13, 31, 137, 174 Ford Foundation 46, 76, 119 foundations 36, 50–51, 52, 60, 137, 153, 156, 166–7, 185, 187 corporate 29–30, 48, global 10, 40, 48 private 40, 44–7, 67, 119, 136, 170 religious 48, 146 “fourth sector” 41, 56 see also enterprise; entrepreneurship France 41 free-rider problem 23–4, 42–3 Gandhian ideals 6, 8, 70–71, 77, 80, 91 Gandhi, Indira 73 Gandhi, Rajiv 74 Gates Foundation see Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation geography 8–9, 49, 57–9, 63, 191 see also location Ghana 119, 152 Giving Pledge 45 “glass floor” 39, 94–5, 111 global civil society 31 Global Innovation Index 5–6, 69 global merit goods 20–22, 25, 32, 52 global public goods 11, 15–16, 20–21, 27, 44. hybrid domain 1–2, 4, 6, 8, 11–13, 27–34, 40, 44–5, 48, 51–2, 67–8, 136–8, 163, 172–4, 187–91 hybrid entities 2, 30, 189 hybrid governance 5, 31–3 hybrid logic 28, 190 hybrid mission 30, 56 hybrid norms see norms hybrid organization see organization Hyderabad 10 I3N (Intellecap Impact Investment Network) 51 ICTs (information and communication technologies) 3, 15, 23–4, 54–5, 60, 191 see also Internet IIT (Indian Institute of Technology) 182 illiteracy 3, 100 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 74–5 immigrants 43, 182 see also migrants immunoassays 115 impact investment 49–51, 164 impacts disruptive 96, 151, 191 social 2, 55–6, 63, 67, 111, 138, 174, 189 systemic 5, 15, 56, 188–90 import-substitution 72 incentive 76, 190 deficient 64 financial 47 user 64–6, 99 inclusion financial 81–2, 122, 125–7 socio-political 5, 122, 134 inclusive capitalism see capitalism inclusive development see development India 5–11, 69–81, 101–37 Indian Angels Network 51 indigenous knowledge 60 requirement 96 technology 72, 75 Indonesia 107, 121, 152 Industrial Policy (India) 72, 75 i industrialization 34, 72–3, 188–9 infant mortality rate 152. Singh, Manmohan 75 slum, 31, 84,103–5, 145, 151, 157, 161, 167, 181 SMS (short message service) 97–8, 119–20, 130, 135 social capital 43, 50, 186 social enterprise see enterprise; social entrepreneurship see entrepreneurship social exclusion 54 social finance 33, 49–50, 60, 184–5, 187 Social Impact Bonds 50 Social Innovation Fund 183 social legitimacy 39, 164 see also reputation social networks 129–30, 179, 181–3 social value 31, 39–42, 55, 189 social welfare 41, 70, 81, 190 socialism, Fabian 76 socialization of markets 2 solar PV (photovoltaic) 133, 135 South Africa 69–71, 132 South–South knowledge transfer 106–9 see also innovation, reverse sovereignty 22, 32, 79 Sri Lanka 133 SSA (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan) 80, 124 SSBM (socially sustainable business model) see business model SSN (Social Success Note) 51 stakeholder 4, 10–11, 13, 22, 27–8, 32–5, 41, 52, 56, 63, 81, 119, 131, 136–7, 145, 166, 191 dialog 35 hybrid 163 self-maximizing 23–4 see also capitalism; governance Stanford University 44, 177 state 16, 28, 67–8, 70–81, 154–6 bureaucratic 25 devolution of 42 failure 4, 11, 53, 67, 91, 189–90 -market relations 3, 13–14, 17 marketization of see marketization of the state STPs (Software Technology Parks) 74 “strategic stickiness” 42 supply chain 103, 116–17, 119, 148
How to transform your organisation for our changed world.
It means addressing how the whole organisation must work: how it creates value for customers, communities and society, and how it maintains and increases productivity.. Effectively changing where and when your people work, what spaces you provide to employees, clients and customers, and what technology is used are not straightforward changes.. Craig Hughes, Global Real Estate & Hybrid Transformation Leader, PwC UK, says: “Don’t approach this problem by making superficial changes to your offices, or focusing only on how many days per week people will be in, or what technology you need.. As well as needing a clear business case for the hybrid transformation your organisation needs, it is critical to ensure changes are right for your people and will bed in effectively.. Organisations must also understand the options available to encourage people back into the office, from reassurances about health and safety in the days following the easing of lockdown restrictions to informing them how the employee experience in the office is evolving.. “Think about the ways in which you can work with teams to create the best possible experiences and spaces for them, at home, in the office, in other shared spaces, while doing what you can to shape and manage occupancy levels to support those experiences and the organisation’s needs every day, every week, every year.”. Some organisations are looking to introduce an agile property portfolio through shorter, more flexible leases or by working with flexible office space providers.. 77% of UK organisations plan to reconfigure their existing office space. 50% think they will reduce the size of their office portfolio. With the scale of the changes required, there is not only an opportunity for you to reimagine the role of the office and shape a hybrid future, but a chance to define a ‘third space’ between work and home - a shared digital realm that delivers great experiences wherever people are logging on.. Data must play an increasingly important role, with sensors and smart office technologies, wearables and data analytics giving details on the effectiveness of any hybrid offering, from levels of occupancy and the flow of people through the office, to the health implications for individuals.
Free Online Library: The Rise of the Hybrid Domain: Collaborative Governance for Social Innovation.(Book review) by "Journal of Southeast Asian Economies"; Business Business, international Economics Books Book reviews
In this context, the. authors of this book have proposed a novel concept of "hybrid. domain".. Known as the "Telemedicine Programme", it provides for local. franchisees who act as intermediaries between patients (usually in. remote areas) and centrally located doctors based in urban centres.. Started as a pilot in. the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, the programme has now expanded to. other poor states, too.. Authors argue. that this "domain flexibility" is a long-drawn process of. "merging economic and social missions" with shared values and. learning from these hybrid collaborations, ultimately resulting in. successful social innovations.. A survey conducted by the authors shows. that collaborations are important for learning and developing an. understanding about the "contexts and needs".. However, these collaborations are not without. challenges.. In this book, the authors have also tried to unravel some. global-local linkages by highlighting the "scalar flexibility". of hybrid domains.. These entrepreneurs are often situated at the unique. intersection of both social and economic realms bringing together the. local and global aspects of implementation, technology and finance.. Hybrid. domains have extended beyond nation states and attained both domain and. scalar flexibility--what authors call "cross-scalar". hybridity.. While the authors have successfully conceptualized hybrid domains. in current volume, the role of the state appears somewhat problematic in. this model.. Indeed, the state does provide both. the policy as well as the political context.. Has norm diffusion occurred from the. global to the local or vice versa?. An. exploration of these norm linkages would have added robustness to the. argument.. Next Article: Economic Development: What Everyone Needs to Know.
Yuko Aoyama and Balaji Parthasarathy explore possibilities for new governance structures that blend social and economic missions and advance the livelihoods of the poor in the Global South.
Although various aspects of the hybrid domain have been reported and analyzed as separate processes – from the marketization of the state to the socialization of markets the authors argue that these processes should be understood within a single conceptual framework.. The hybrid domain draws diverse stakeholders have only one mission in common, which is to find a solution to a social project that encounters bottlenecks of innovation, implementation, and adoption i.e., solutions to typically “wicked problems”.. While most theories of collaboration require developing cohesion by way of shared norms and common agendas, the hybrid domain draws strengths from heterogeneous stakeholders from various geographies, who converge on a common desire for social change.. Broadly defined, social innovation refers to innovation with strong social impacts, one that is designed to fulfill unmet social needs of under-served populations.. The pursuit of social innovation coincides with growing public interest in ethical investments, and the attendant shift in the priorities of corporations in the Global North from the single- to the triple- bottom-line of social, environmental, and the economic objectives.. In addition, there is heightened interest in social entrepreneurship in North America and Europe, with social entrepreneurs becoming transnational to address social missions.. Furthermore, transnational social entrepreneurs, mainly transplants from the Global North, including those not of Indian origin, play an increasingly pivotal role in coordinating globally sourced technology, business know-how, and financing, to develop solutions to critical local problems.. It is important to recognize its emergence and its growth, for the hybrid domain is a fertile seedbed for social innovation, from which catalytic, systemic solutions may emerge.. The rise of the hybrid domain signifies the shift from shareholder-driven to stakeholder-driven capitalism on the one hand, and the growing role of civil society organizations as key stakeholders working in conjunction with the state and corporations in pursuing social missions on the other.. Through an analysis of various forms of collaborations for social innovation, the book seeks to break an intellectual impasse that has developed in academic discourses over ideal forms of governance, primarily between those who believe in market solutions as a preferred vehicle to address societal problems, and those who believe in state actions.. economic geography , hybrid domain , India , social innovation
The rise of the hybrid domain. Collaborative governance for social innovation. Aoyama, Yuko; Parthasarathy, Balaji. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. 978-1-78536-042-8
Se trata de una dimensión en la que confluyen el estado, el mercado y las organizaciones de lo que algunos han llamado el tercer sector.. El segundo capítulo argumenta que las formas usuales de organizar los recursos, sea desde el estado o desde el mercado, están siendo abandonadas para dar lugar a formas de gobernanza policéntricas y de red.. El foco en ese tipo de problemas es el eje del capítulo que sigue, donde se examinan una serie de estudios de caso en la India.. El argumento central que recorre el libro es que hay una forma híbrida que está emergiendo y que resulta de la intersección de las lógicas del mercado, el estado y las instituciones y organizaciones intermedias.. Si bien los autores reconocen que es una forma emergente, que es la punta de un iceberg, ellos argumentan que se trata de una forma superadora de lo que hasta ahora hemos visto.. Es más, gran parte del libro está dedicado a mostrar a través de una serie de ejemplos y casos que este dominio híbrido es superador de otras formas de gobernanza y que es un instrumento particularmente adecuado para resolver problemas que parecían no tener solución.. El argumento respecto a la expansión de este dominio va de la mano de un fuerte-y quizás algo exagerado argumento--respecto a la obsolescencia del estado como actor central en la resolución de los problemas sociales.. Esta visión probablemente se derive del hecho que el sustento empírico del volumen sea un conjunto de estudios de caso de la India: un caso muy particular y extremo que combina situaciones de fuerte involucramiento del estado en la resolución de algunos problemas sociales con la ausencia de ese estado en muchas otras circunstancias ( Gonzalo 2018 GONZALO, Manuel.. 372 f. Tese (Doutorado e Economia) - Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, Instituto de Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2018.).. En ese sentido, la experiencia de la India quizás sea bastante diferente a la de gran parte de los países de América Latina en los que, hasta ahora, no había sido tan significativa la participación de las empresas privadas en la resolución de problemas sociales básicos como la salud, el hábitat y la educación ( Thomas 2009 THOMAS, Hernán.. Más allá de que algunos lectores quizás encontrarán que ciertas afirmaciones del texto son algo controversiales, el volumen se apoya en un amplio trabajo de campo que incluye encuestas, entrevistas y estudios de caso, en su gran mayoría realizadas en la India, pero también en otros países.. Esos casos muestran la relevancia de las organizaciones sociales, de las ONGs y, en menor medida, de las empresas privadas, en el desarrollo de soluciones orientadas a resolver problemas sociales; al mismo tiempo, esos casos muestran una participación marginal del estado.. Por un lado, coloca el acento en el problema de la gobernanza de los proyectos orientados a la resolución de problemas sociales de enorme complejidad en un contexto de fuertes restricciones de todo tipo.. Por el otro, provee un riquísimo material empírico no sólo para acercarse a la realidad de la India sino, también, para contrastar esa experiencia con la de América Latina.. 372 f. Tese (Doutorado e Economia) - Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, Instituto de Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2018.